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Abstract
This paper studies the trading volumes and wealth distribution
of a novel agent-based model of an artificial financial market. In this
model, heterogeneous agents, behaving according to the Von Neumann
and Morgenstern utility theory, may mutually interact. A Tobin-like
tax (TT) on successful investments and a flat tax are compared to
assess the effects on the agents’ wealth distribution. We carry out
extensive numerical simulations in two alternative scenarios: i) a ref-
erence scenario, where the agents keep their utility function fixed, and
ii) a focal scenario, where the agents are adaptive and self-organize in
communities, emulating their neighbours by updating their own utility
function. Specifically, the interactions among the agents are modelled
through a directed scale-free network to account for the presence of
community leaders, and the herding-like effect is tested against the
reference scenario. We observe that our model is capable of replicat-
ing the benefits and drawbacks of the two taxation systems and that
the interactions among the agents strongly affect the wealth distri-
bution across the communities. Remarkably, the communities benefit
from the presence of leaders with successful trading strategies, and
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are more likely to increase their average wealth. Moreover, this emu-
lation mechanism mitigates the decrease in trading volumes, which is
a typical drawback of TTs.
1 Introduction
Neoclassical economics plays a fundamental role in the study of price and in-
come distributions in markets [1]. Recent studies are focused on the develop-
ment of tools and approaches that may complement neoclassical economics,
removing some of its main assumptions, such as rationality and homogeneity
of the financial agents [2, 3]. A special interest emerged for a complex sys-
tem approach, which involves the use of agent-based and behavioural mod-
els [2–20]. In this way, the simulated behaviour of a high number of decision-
makers and institutions (the agents), interacting through prescribed rules,
can be investigated to highlight the macro features of the market emerging
from the dynamic interactions among the players.
In the last decades, notable artificial financial models have been devel-
oped. The model in [11] provides a tenable explanation for bubbles and
crashes, replicating liquidity crashes that cannot be predicted with equilib-
rium models. The studies in [21,22] support the idea that scaling and fluctu-
ations in financial prices arise from mutual agents’ interactions rather than
from the efficient market hypothesis. The dynamics of companies’ growth and
decline have been reproduced in [23], reflecting the power-law distribution
of company size. In agent-based financial markets, agents can be modelled
as zero-intelligence traders, acting randomly with a budget constraint [24],
or as heterogeneous agents with bounded rationality, endowed with utility
functions, who can envision strategies with limited complexity [7, 10, 25].
Moreover, agents may have the capability of adapting their actions according
to their current state, the information gathered from the environment [26],
and the rules governing their behaviour [27]. Different types of adaptive
behaviour may be considered, such as learning, search and imitation [28].
Indeed, the capability of an investor of imitating the actions of others is one
of the key elements of the widespread phenomenon of herding in financial
markets [29–32]. The concepts of learning and adaptation are also applied
to utility functions, that may not be fixed, as observed in [32–34].
Agent-based approaches have also been used to test the effects of poli-
cies, regulations and taxation systems on the market dynamics, see for in-
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stance [15, 16]. Inspired by the seminal work of Tobin [35], several taxes on
financial transactions were proposed to regulate the markets, whose effects
have been controversial [36, 37]. The effect of taxation was also investigated
in the kinetic exchange market models, see [17–20] and references therein.
In [17, 18], the authors reviewed the recent advances in the study of income
and wealth distribution. In particular, they focused on the kinetic exchange
market models and illustrated their microeconomic foundations. In [19], an
ad hoc stochastic asset evolution was considered which explained the gamma-
function-like income distribution. Later, Ref. [20] provided a microeconomic
framework to derive asset equations consistent to those used in the ideal gas
market models: at each time step, the agents randomly meet to transact
according to the maximization of their Cobb-Douglas utility function. The
authors analysed the steady-state income distribution for different values of a
redistribution parameter, which mitigates the inequalities in wealth distribu-
tion. In particular, in [20] the steady-state wealth distribution was observed
to be gamma-function-like, and studied in presence of a redistributive tax.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing models of artificial
markets accounts for herding phenomena and different taxation schemes at
the same time. In this work, we build a novel artificial financial market
capable of testing the delicate interplay between herding-like interactions,
the inequality in wealth distribution, and the balancing of two common al-
ternative taxation schemes. The agents behave according to utility theory,
and are grouped in three classes with different risk attitudes and subsequent
trading strategies. We study the emerging features of the market in terms
of trading volumes and wealth distribution, characterized through the Gini
coefficient [38], in presence of a Tobin-like tax (TT) and a flat tax (FT), re-
spectively. Specifically, we investigate two agents’ behavioural scenarios: i)
stubborn agents [39], who keep their own risk attitude regardless of the effec-
tiveness of the consequent trading strategy (reference scenario); ii) adaptive
agents, who self-organize in communities to emulate the strategy of their rich-
est neighbours (focal scenario). These latter act as leaders and are modelled
as the hubs of a directed scale-free network [40].
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe the pro-
posed model of a financial market in terms of agents behaviour, alternative
taxation schemes, and interaction rules. In section 3, the focal scenario is
tested against the reference one. The interplay between the different taxa-
tion systems and agents’ behavioural adaptation is analysed, with a special
emphasis on the effects on wealth distribution and trading volumes. Finally,
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conclusions are drawn in section 4.
2 The model
We introduce an agent-based model of a financial market populated by a
set of n agents, who can choose among alternative financial assets. The
state of each agent j is defined as his current wealth xj and risk attitude
αj. The agents behave according to the Von Neumann and Morgenstern
utility theory [41], and alternative taxation schemes and interaction rules
are considered.
2.1 Market structure
At time 0, the state of agent j is given by his initial wealth and risk attitude,
denoted xj0 and αj0, respectively, j = 1, . . . , n. At each time step k = 1, 2, ...,
a simulated trading session is performed. Each agent, in a sequential random
order, evaluates the convenience of investing a given fraction δ of his current
wealth xj(k) in one of the financial assets from the set I = {1, . . . ,m}. The
assets in I are characterized by a limited availability Ai, i = 1, ...,m, where
Am = +∞ is associated to a virtual asset, corresponding to no-investment.
In view of this, each agent is allowed to invest in one of the available assets,
that is, in any element of I such that Ai ≥ δxj(k). Agents’ access to trading
is randomly permuted at each time step k, so that, on average, no agent is
favoured. After each trading, the availability of the selected asset is updated
before the next agent is allowed to trade.
2.2 Agent behaviours
2.2.1 Agent trading strategy
A power-law utility function characterizes the risk attitude of each agent. At
each trading session k, agent j decides to invest a fraction δ of its current
wealth xj(k) in the most profitable asset i ∈ I, selected by comparing the
expected utilities
E[Uj(xj(k), i)] = 0.5
[
(aiδxj(k))
αj(k) + (biδxj(k))
αj(k)
]
, i = 1, ...,m, (1)
where αj(k) is a (possibly time-varying) coefficient which determines the risk
attitude of the j -th agent, ai and bi are the win and loss rates associated to
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the i -th asset, i = 1, . . . ,m 1. Based on their current risk attitude, we group
the agents in three classes. In the first one, there are the agents characterized
by a low risk attitude, denoted in what follows as prudent agents. The agents
that are more prone to take risks are denoted audacious and grouped in the
third class. Finally, the intermediate class groups the ordinary agents. We
emphasize here that an agent may decide not to invest (formally, to invest in
the m-th asset), if E[Uj(xj(k),m)] ≥ E[Uj(xj(k), i)] for all i = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
The outcome of the trade is the realization β of a uniform Bernoulli random
variable B. Therefore, the wealth x−j (k) of the agent j at time k before the
taxation is given by:
x−j (k) = xj(k − 1) + βδxj(k)(ai − 1)− (1− β)δxj(k)(1− bi). (2)
When the trading session is over, a tax is applied and the wealth of agent j
at time k is updated as
xj(k) = τ(x
−
j (k)), (3)
where τ is the function describing the selected taxation scheme, see section
2.4.
2.2.2 Interaction among the agents
We consider two alternative scenarios. In the reference scenario, the market
is composed of stubborn agents, who do not modify their utility function even
if they observe that their investing strategy is not successful. Accordingly,
their risk attitude is considered as a parameter rather than an evolving state,
that is, αj(k) = αj0, for all k ∈ N, j = 1, . . . , n. In the focal scenario, instead,
the agents are adaptive, as they are prone to directly interact with each other
and update their trading strategy. In particular, we model the strategy modi-
fication as a variation of the coefficient αj(k) in (1). We emphasize that αj(k)
is referred to as “risk attitude” for simplicity, but it may also embed other
relevant factors determining the expected utility function of agent j, such
as the perceived information level of the other investors [32]. The reciprocal
influence among the agents diffuses through a connection topology described
by a directed graph G = {V , E}, where V is the set of nodes, corresponding
to the agents, and E is the set of directed edges connecting the nodes. The
existence of an edge (i, j) implies that the risk attitude of node j is influenced
1Notice that the win and loss rates associated to the virtual asset are am = bm = 1.
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by that of node i. The herding-like dynamics of the coefficients αj(k) in (1)
is described by
αj(k) = (1− w)αj(0) + w|Nj|
∑
h∈Nj
αh(k − 1), (4)
where w is the interaction weight, αj(0) = αj0, and Nj is the set of the
neighbours of the j -th agent, defined as Nj = {i ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ E}. We remark
that the bigger the coefficient w is, the more the agents are prone to modify
their utility function: w = 0 models the case of stubborn agents, while w = 1
the case in which the agents completely disregard their innate risk attitudes
and emulate the neighbours’ behaviour.
2.3 Leaders and communities
The interaction topology is modelled as a disjoint directed scale-free network,
and the graph G is decomposed in up to three disconnected components, the
communities, each of which is guided by leaders belonging to the same risk
attitude class. Namely, inside each community, we consider emulating the
rich dynamics, where the richest agents are stubborn, but influence the other
agents, so playing the role of leaders [42]. We choose to consider separated
communities so that each follower cannot be influenced by leaders with signif-
icantly different risk attitudes. Accordingly, each follower elects to emulate
the strategy he considers most profitable. The size of the communities is
proportional to the total wealth of their leaders and, inside each community,
the richest agents are more likely to activate links.
The interaction is triggered at a given time instant kt. Henceforth, the
dynamics of αj(k), j = 1, ..., n, described in (4), are strongly influenced
by the structure of the graph G describing the diffusion flow. In turn, the
structure of G is established at time kt, based on the current wealth xj(kt),
for j = 1, . . . , n.
2.4 Taxation schemes
We consider two alternative taxation systems, which affect the current wealth
of the agents x−j (k) in different ways: a) taxation on financial transactions,
and b) taxation on wealth. Type a) tax is a Tobin-like tax, which reduces
6
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Figure 1. Reference scenario. Final wealth distribution when TT (a) and FT (b) schemes
are introduced, respectively.
the current wealth of the winning agents by a profit fraction u(k) given by
u(k) =
{
p(k)∑n
j=1 sj(k)
, p(k) > 0,
0, p(k) ≤ 0, (5)
where sj(k) = x
−
j (k)−xj(k−1), and p(k) =
∑n
j=1(x
−
j (k)−xj0). Accordingly,
(3) becomes
xj(k) = x
−
j (k)−H(sj(k))sj(k)u(k), (6)
where H is the Heaviside step function.
The alternative taxation scheme b) is a FT, in which the amount of the
tax is proportional to the total wealth of the individual. Accordingly, (3)
becomes
xj(k) = v(k)x
−
j (k), (7)
where v(k) =
∑n
j=1 xj0∑n
j=1 x
−
j (k)
.
Notice that, to allow for a proper comparison between the two taxa-
tion schemes, the coefficients u(k) and v(k) in (5) and (7), respectively,
are selected so as to keep the average wealth constant over time, that is,
1
n
∑n
j=1 xj(k) = x¯.
3 Results
The proposed model of artificial financial market can take into account dif-
ferent scenarios, in terms of both taxation schemes and interaction rules. In
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Figure 2. Reference scenario. Gini coefficient (a) and trading volumes (b) when TT
(blue line) and FT (red line) schemes are introduced, respectively.
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Figure 3. Focal scenario. Average number of leaders of belonging to the communities 1
(red line), 2 (blue line) and 3 (green line) for different interaction triggering time kt when
TT (a) and FT (b) schemes are introduced, respectively.
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Figure 4. Final wealth distribution when TT scheme is introduced: reference (a) and
focal (b) scenarios, respectively. The width of the bars is proportional to the numerosity
of the classes.
this section, we analyse the emerging features in the focal scenario, aiming at
identifying the possible interplay between taxation and interaction in deter-
mining the trading volumes and the wealth distribution among the agents.
To do so, we compare the results of extensive simulations of the focal sce-
nario against those of the reference one. The effect of the alternative taxation
schemes are firstly pointed out in the reference scenario. Then, we focus on
adaptive agents and study the effects induced by the emulating dynamics
on the wealth distribution for both taxation schemes. To achieve statistical
relevance, we run 1000 simulations for each scenario and consider a number
of time steps sufficient to reach steady-state wealth distribution.
We consider n = 1000 agents that share the same initial capital xj0 =
100$, j = 1, . . . , n, and, at each trading session k, can decide to invest a
fraction δ = 0.2 of their current wealth. The cardinality of the set of assets
I is m = 4, that is, the agents can trade in three categories of actual assets,
while the fourth one corresponds to no-investment and, therefore, has an
unlimited availability. On the other hand, at every time instant, each of the
three actual assets has an availability equal to 1/15th of the total wealth of
the system. The win and loss rates associated to the actual assets are selected
so that the prudent agents (0.5 ≤ αj(k) < 0.67) only consider investing in
the first and less risky asset, the ordinary agents (0.67 ≤ αj(k) < 0.83)
also consider the second, while the audacious agents (0.83 ≤ αj(k) ≤ 1)
also find convenient investing in the third and most risky one. Namely, the
won rates are a1 = 1.53, a2 = 1.60, and a3 = 1.67, while the loss rates
9
1"
2"
3"1"
2"
3"
Figure 5. Focal scenario, TT scheme. Screenshots of the three communities before (left
panel) and after (right panel) the herding-like effect in a sample simulation. The red, blue,
and green nodes correspond to prudent, ordinary, and audacious agents, respectively. No-
tice that the averaging of the attitudes increases the overall density of ordinary agents.
However, the leaders’ influence skews the distribution across the communities, with pru-
dent and audacious agents still populating the first and third community, respectively.
are b1 = 0.6, b2 = 0.5, and b3 = 0.4. Notice that, with this parameter
selection, E[Uj(xj(k), 1)] > E[Uj(xj(k), 2)] > E[Uj(xj(k), 3)], j = 1, ..., n.
The initial risk attitudes αj0, j = 1, ..., n, are uniformly distributed in the
interval [0.5, 1].
3.1 Reference scenario
In our numerical analysis, we monitor the effect of the alternative taxation
schemes on both the wealth distribution and the trading volumes in the
artificial market. Specifically, we observe that the TT scheme hinders the
audacious agents, favouring the prudent ones. This is clearly depicted in
figure 1(a), which shows the sum of the average final wealth in the three
classes of agents, respectively. The opposite is observed when a flat tax is
adopted, in which the wealth distribution is biased towards the ordinary and
audacious agents, see figure 1(b). In other words, the TT scheme does not
reward the risk, penalizing the audacious agents, in opposition to the FT
scheme, which encourages the agents to trade.
A second striking difference among the two taxation schemes is the overall
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Figure 6. Average final wealth of the agents belonging to communities 1, 2 and 3, when
TT scheme is introduced: reference (a) and focal (b) scenarios, respectively.
wealth dispersion. To point out this emerging feature, we consider the Gini
coefficient G(k), proposed by Corrado Gini in [38] as a measure of inequality
of income or wealth, which can be defined as
G(k) = 1− 2
n− 1
(
n−
∑n
j=1 jxj(k)∑n
j=1 xj(k)
)
, (8)
where the wealths xj(k), j = 1, . . . , n, are indexed in non-decreasing order
(xj(k) ≤ xj+1(k)). The Gini coefficient varies between 0, which reflects
complete equality, and 1, which indicates complete inequality (one person
holds the all wealth, all others have none). As depicted in figure 2(a), while
the TT scheme induces a wealth redistribution among the population, the
FT scheme increases inequalities. On the other hand, the TT scheme leads
to lower trading volumes at the steady-state, see figure 2(b). The latter effect
is in line with the criticisms commonly made to financial transaction taxes,
which are blamed for possible market depression [36,43,44].
3.2 Focal scenario
We assume that, after kt time steps in which the agents invest based on
their own risk attitude, the emulation dynamics described in (4) are trig-
gered. The triggering instant of the emulation behaviour is indifferent to our
purpose, as alternative values of kt only affect the size of the communities,
see figure 3. The ten richest agents (the leaders) are assumed to have only
outgoing edges; the followers, instead, have bidirectional edges with their
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neighbouring peers, and may have ingoing edges from the leaders. To model
this interaction mechanism, we build a directed Baraba´si-Albert (BA) scale-
free network [40], in which the hubs coincide with the leaders. The network
is split into three communities, led by the prudent, ordinary, and audacious
leaders, respectively. The size of each community is proportional to the sum
of the leaders’ wealth, which is an indirect measure of their influence.
The results are compared against a twin set of simulations in the reference
scenario, sharing the same set of realizations of the Bernoulli variable B in
(2). For the sake of clarity, we analyse the two taxation schemes separately,
starting with the TT scheme. From figure 4, we observe that this taxa-
tion system, regardless of the interactions among the agents, recompenses
the prudent strategies in the long run. The emulating the rich interaction,
instead, skews the distribution among the communities, see figure 5. In ab-
sence of leaders, the interaction with the neighbours would tend to average
the agents’ attitudes towards risk. However, the presence of leaders differen-
tiates the communities. In particular, the community guided by the prudent
leaders preserves a significant number of prudent agents (the 20.29% of the
total population of the community, see table 1). Consequently, the average
wealth of the agents in the first community is considerably higher compared
with the other two communities (see figure 6(b)), whose leaders pursue risky
strategies which turn to be unprofitable in the long term (their steady-state
capital is lower than the average agents’ wealth x¯ = 100, see table 2).
Moreover, figure 7 shows that the herding mechanism has the further
effect of mitigating the decrease in trading volumes typical of the TT case.
This is due to the reduction of the total number of prudent agents illustrated
in figure 4. Differently from the TT case, in which the prudent agents slowly
but relentlessly take the leadership of the market, see figure 3(a), when the
flat tax is introduced, a prudent strategy is disadvantageous both in the short
and in the long term, see figure 3(b). Consequently, no agent is encouraged to
emulate the prudent agents, and the market splits into only two communities,
guided by the ordinary and audacious leaders, respectively. Accordingly,
there are no notable differences in the average wealth of the two communities,
see table 1. We emphasize that, while the emulating dynamics can strongly
influence the distribution of the wealth across the communities, the overall
wealth distribution is only dictated by the taxation scheme. In particular,
the variation of the Gini coefficient induced by the emulation dynamics is an
order of magnitude lower than that induced by a change of taxation scheme,
for any possible value of the interaction weight w and of the average degree
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Table 1. Legend. x¯r(T ) and x¯f (T ) are the average final wealth in the reference and focal
scenarios, respectively; νci is the average numerosity of the i-th community, i = 1, 2, 3;
fj is the final percentage of agents belonging to the j-th class, j = 1, 2, 3. Confidence
intervals with significance level 0.05 are also reported.
Tobin Tax Flat Tax
Community 1 2 3 1 2 3
x¯r(T )/x¯ 1.01 0.97 0.98 0 1.07 0.97
[0.99, 1.02] [0.96, 0.99] [0.97, 1.00] [1.01, 1.13] [0.94, 1.01]
x¯f (T )/x¯ 1.40 0.74 0.71 0 1.05 0.98
[1.38, 1.42] [0.73, 0.75] [0.70, 0.73] [0.99, 1.11] [0.95, 1.01]
νci 380.76 347.63 271.61 0 246.24 753.76
[369.89, 391.01] [336.54, 357.92] [260.91, 281.71] [235.76, 256.19] [742.78, 763.20]
f1(%) 20.29 0.60 0.01 0 0.80 0
[19.78, 20.80] [0.53, 0.66] [0.01, 0.02] [0.69, 0.92]
f2(%) 79.71 99.40 93.04 0 99.16 93.13
[79.20, 80.21] [99.32, 99.45] [92.67, 93.41] [99.04, 99.27] [92.95, 93.32]
f3(%) 0 0 6.95 0 0.04 6.87
[6.58, 7.32] [0.03, 0.06] [6.68, 7.05]
of the connection topology.
We remark that considering disconnected communities is an idealization
of real-world aggregations, where few weak links may still connect the com-
munities. However, all the presented results are robust to the addition of
links connecting the communities. This is confirmed by a twin set of simula-
tions in which a small fraction (less than 5%) of the network edges are rewired
following a degree-preserving procedure inspired by the work in [45]. Con-
sidering 95% confidence intervals, we find that the variations of the results
are not statistically significant.
4 Discussion
In this paper, we presented a novel agent-based model of a financial mar-
ket. The agent behaviour has been modelled according to the Von Neumann
and Morgenstern utility theory, which led to the definition of three possible
trading strategies. Based on the selected strategy, the agents were classi-
fied as prudent, ordinary, or audacious. The proposed model allowed for a
numerical study of the interplay between herding-like dynamics, the wealth
inequalities, and the redistributive effect of two common alternative taxation
schemes. Specifically, we considered agents capable of adapting their util-
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Table 2. Legend. x¯l(T ) is the average final wealth of the leaders in the focal scenario;
νli is the average numerosity of the leaders of the i-th community, i = 1, 2, 3. Confidence
intervals with significance level 0.05 are also reported.
Leaders L1 L2 L3
x¯l(T )/x¯ 7.69 0.66 0.64
Tobin Tax [7.18,8.19] [0.59,0.72] [0.37,0.90]
νli 4.30 3.20 2.50
[4.20,4.40] [3.10,3.29] [2.41,2.59]
x¯l(T )/x¯ 0 14.29 14.48
Flat Tax [12.60,15.98] [13.24,15.71]
νli 0 3.03 6.97
[2.94,3.12] [6.88, 7.06]
ity function emulating the strategic behaviour of the successful agents. The
emerging wealth distribution and trading volumes were compared against the
reference scenario of stubborn agents, who maintain their beliefs regardless of
the outcome of their trades. The analysis was carried out for two alternative
taxation schemes, introducing a Tobin-like tax and a flat tax. The emerg-
ing features of the market have been investigated through a set of extensive
simulations in a market populated by 1000 agents.
The numerical analysis of the reference scenario replicated the well known
benefits and drawbacks of the two taxation schemes. Indeed, we observed
a trade-off between wealth redistribution and trading volumes: while the
Tobin-like tax has the effect of redistributing the wealth among the agents,
but reduces the trading volumes, the opposite happens with a flat tax, which
encourages to invest, but dramatically increases the disparity among the
agents. Moreover, while the TT scheme favoured the prudent agents in-
vesting only in the less risky assets, the FT scheme rewarded the audacious
agents, that also consider investing in the riskiest assets. In the focal sce-
nario, where the adaptive agents consider adjusting their risk attitude and the
consequent trading strategy, we observed a significant impact of the agents
interactions on the emerging features of the market. Indeed, the richest
agents, recognized as the market leaders, formed separate communities. No-
tably, we observed that the communities benefit from the presence of leaders
with successful trading strategies, and are more likely to increase their av-
erage wealth. Moreover, this herding-like behaviour mitigated the reduction
of the trading volumes typical of Tobin-like taxes, while preserving its redis-
tributive effect. Ongoing works are devoted to further investigate the driving
14
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Figure 7. Trading volumes when TT scheme is introduced: reference (blue line) and
focal (red line) scenarios, respectively.
factors of herding, explicitly accounting for the effect of external inputs, such
as the information gathered from the environment.
References
[1] Backhouse R 1985 A history of modern economic analysis (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell)
[2] Mantegna R N and Kerte´sz J 2011 New Journal of Physics 13 025011
[3] Cristelli M, Pietronero L and Zaccaria A 2010 Critical overview of agent-
based models for economics Proceedings of the School of Physics ”E.
Fermi”
[4] Alfi V, Cristelli M, Pietronero L and Zaccaria A 2009 The European
Physical Journal B-Condensed Matter and Complex Systems 67 385–
397
[5] Cavagna A, Garrahan J P, Giardina I and Sherrington D 1999 Physical
Review Letters 83 4429
[6] Pastore S, Ponta L and Cincotti S 2010 New Journal of Physics 12
053035
[7] Cincotti S, Focardi S M, Marchesi M and Raberto M 2003 Physica A
324 227–233
[8] Farmer J D and Foley D 2009 Nature 460 685–686
15
[9] Gilbert N 2008 Agent-based models 153 (Sage)
[10] LeBaron B 2001 Quantitative Finance 1 254–261
[11] LeBaron B 2002 Building the Santa Fe artificial stock market Brandeis
University, working paper
[12] Tumminello M, Lillo F, Piilo J and Mantegna R N 2012 New Journal of
Physics 14 013041
[13] Westerhoff F 2010 New Journal of Physics 12 075035
[14] San Miguel M, Johnson J H, Kertesz J, Kaski K, Dı´az-Guilera A,
MacKay R S, Loreto V, E´rdi P and Helbing D 2012 European Phys-
ical Journal-Special Topics 214 245
[15] Westerhoff F H and Dieci R 2006 Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control 30 293–322
[16] Dignum F, Dignum V and Jonker C M 2009 Towards agents for policy
making Multi-Agent-Based Simulation IX (Springer-Verlag) pp 141–153
[17] Chakrabarti B K, Chakraborti A, Chakravarty S R and Chatterjee
A 2013 Econophysics of Income and Wealth Distributions (New York:
Cambridge University Press)
[18] Pareschi L and Toscani G 2014 Interacting Multiagent Systems (Oxford,
United Kingdom: Oxford University Press)
[19] Guala S D 2009 Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems 7 1–7
[20] Chakrabarti A S and Chakrabarti B K 2009 Physica A 388 4151–4158
[21] Lux T and Marchesi M 1999 Nature 397 498–500
[22] Zawadowski A G, Karadi R and Kertesz J 2002 Physica A: Statistical
Mechanics and its Applications 316 403–412
[23] Axtell R L 2001 Science 293 1818–1820
[24] Gode D K and Sunder S 1993 Journal of Political Economy 101 119–137
[25] Amilon H 2008 Journal of Empirical Finance 15 342–362
16
[26] Lillo F, Micciche` S, Tumminiello M, Pillo J and Mantegna R N 2015
Quantitative Finance 15 213–229
[27] Baek Y, Lee S H and Jeong H 2010 Physical Review E 82 026109
[28] Blume L and Easley D 1992 Journal of Economic theory 58 9–40
[29] Shapira Y, Berman Y and Ben-Jacob E 2014 New Journal of Physics
16 053040
[30] Cipriani M and Guarino A 2009 Journal of the European Economic
Association 7 206–233
[31] Lillo F, Moro E, Vaglica G and Mantegna R N 2008 New Journal of
Physics 10 043019
[32] Decamps J P and Lovo S 2002 Available at SSRN 301962
[33] Cohen M D and Axelrod R 1984 The American Economic Review 74
30–42
[34] Cyert R M and DeGroot M H 1979 Adaptive utility Expected Utility
Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox (Springer) pp 223–241
[35] Tobin J 1978 Eastern Economic Journal 4 pp. 153–159 ISSN 00945056
[36] Hanke M, Huber J, Kirchler M and Sutter M 2010 Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 74 58–71
[37] Li H, Tang M, Shang W and Wang S 2013 Procedia Computer Science
18 1764–1773
[38] Gini C 1912 Reprinted in Memorie di metodologica statistica (Ed. Pizetti
E, Salvemini, T). Rome: Libreria Eredi Virgilio Veschi 1
[39] Porfiri M, Bollt E M and Stilwell D 2007 The European Physical Journal
B-Condensed Matter and Complex Systems 57 481–486
[40] Baraba´si A L and Albert R 1999 Science 286 509–512
[41] Von Neumann J and Morgenstern O 2007 Theory of Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior (60th Anniversary Commemorative Edition) (Princeton
University Press)
17
[42] Ellero A, Fasano G and Sorato A 2013 Physical Review E 87 042806
[43] Baltagi B H, Li D and Li Q 2006 Empirical Economics 31 393–408
[44] Mannaro K, Marchesi M and Setzu A 2008 Journal of Economic Behav-
ior & Organization 67 445–462
[45] Lancichinetti A, Fortunato S and Radicchi F 2008 Physical Review E
78 046110
18
